India-ASEAN Partnership for a Resilient Indo Pacific

• 01 Nov 2025

This editorial is based on “​Missed opportunity: On India and ASEAN summit in Malaysia” which was published in The Hindu on 29/11/2025. The article brings into spotlight India’s deepening engagement with ASEAN rooted in shared history and strategic convergence, highlighting the 2025 summit’s call for concrete action on trade, maritime security, technology, and people-to-people connectivity to forge a resilient 21st-century partnership.

For Prelims: ASEAN,  2025 ASEAN-India summit, ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise, India's Unified Payments Interface, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, BrahMos missile, International Solar Alliance, Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDP), 2023. 

For Mains: Key Areas of Convergence Between India and ASEAN, Key Areas of Friction Between India and ASEAN.

 

Since becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1995, India has viewed the annual summits as crucial platforms for engaging with a historically linked region of growing geopolitical significance. The Indian Prime Minister’s virtual address at the 2025 ASEAN-India summit emphasized ambitious cooperation, declaring the 21st century "the century of India and ASEAN" and announcing 2026 as the year of maritime partnership. To deepen this partnership, India and ASEAN must move beyond declarations to concrete action: expediting the AITIGA review, strengthening maritime security cooperation, expanding defense and technology partnerships, and fostering people-to-people connectivity that transforms historical ties into a resilient 21st-century partnership.

What are the Key Areas of Convergence Between India and ASEAN? 

• Geopolitical and Maritime Security Cooperation: Both India and ASEAN share a common strategic outlook on maintaining a rules-based, free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, viewing maritime stability as paramount for economic prosperity and security. 
  • The designation of 2026 as the "ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation" will institutionalize this convergence, building on the first-ever ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME-2023).
  • This convergence is driven by shared concerns over territorial integrity and freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea, reinforcing the centrality of ASEAN-led mechanisms.
  • India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) aligns closely with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), fostering practical cooperation in maritime domain awareness. 
• Economic Integration and Supply Chain Resilience: The two parties are committed to enhancing economic connectivity and reviewing their trade agreement to achieve balanced and inclusive growth, thereby diversifying global supply chains away from single-country dependency. 
• The need for resilient supply chains was highlighted by the pandemic, making diversification a shared strategic priority.
• The ongoing review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), expected to conclude by 2025, aims to unlock the full potential of bilateral trade, which reached USD 121 billion in 2023-24. 
  • This economic pillar also includes India's commitment of a $1 billion credit line for physical and digital connectivity projects.
• Digital Transformation and Fintech: Convergence is strong in leveraging Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), financial technology, and cybersecurity to drive inclusive economic growth and enhance governance across the region. 
  • India's proven model of digital governance and financial inclusion offers immediate, scalable solutions for the ASEAN region's rapidly digitalizing economies.
  • Following the 2024 summit, collaboration on India's Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Singapore’s PayNow linkage is a landmark example, and the ASEAN-India Fund for Digital Future was launched in 2024 to support joint digital projects. This push aims to enhance cross-border payments and digital service delivery.
• Physical and Digital Connectivity: Connectivity serves as the primary enabler of the Act East Policy, focusing on establishing seamless physical, digital, and people-to-people links that integrate Northeast India with the ASEAN region.
  
  • Accelerated infrastructure development is essential to transforming geo-strategic proximity into economic advantage, boosting trade and tourism.
  • Projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project are central, with India allocating a credit line of $1 billion for connectivity and maritime infrastructure projects in ASEAN.
  • The 2025 ASEAN-India Summit reiterated the need for their swift completion.
• Defence Cooperation and Counter-Terrorism: A shared threat perception from transnational terrorism, piracy, and radicalization has cemented a strong convergence in defence and security dialogue, capacity building, and joint exercises. 
  • This collaboration is crucial for maintaining regional stability and coordinating responses to non-traditional security challenges.
  • India co-chairs the Expert Working Group on Counter-Terrorism with Malaysia under the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) for the 2024–2027 cycle, showing deeper institutional integration. India's growing defence exports, like the BrahMos missile sales to the Philippines, further exemplify this strategic alignment.
• Sustainable Development and Green Energy Transition: Both entities recognize the critical challenge of climate change and are converging on sustainable development goals by promoting renewable energy, the circular economy, and environmentally friendly tourism. 
  
  • This area addresses shared vulnerabilities related to energy security and environmental degradation.
  • The 2025 Joint Leaders’ Statement on Sustainable Tourism outlined a collaborative vision for promoting ecotourism and green investment, complementing India's support for the ASEAN Power Grid and collaboration under the International Solar Alliance (ISA). 
    • This focuses on low-carbon infrastructure and technology sharing.
• Socio-Cultural and People-to-People Ties: The deep historical and civilizational links, evident in shared heritage (e.g., Ramayana traditions), serve as the foundational soft power that strengthens mutual understanding and fosters enduring trust. 
  • Enhancing people-to-people interaction is key to sustaining the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the long term.
  • India's commitment to capacity building is supported by the dedicated ASEAN-India Science & Technology Development Fund.
    
    • India offers scholarships and training programs and focuses on youth exchanges, having recently proposed establishing a Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Nalanda University in 2025. 

What are the Key Areas of Friction Between India and ASEAN? 

• Widening Trade Imbalance and FTA Friction: The ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) has resulted in a disproportionate widening of India’s trade deficit, raising concerns over reciprocal market access and the efficacy of the pact. 
  • Indian industries argue that the concessions are skewed, allowing cheap imports from ASEAN while their exports face non-tariff barriers, making the current AITIGA review contentious.
  • India's trade deficit with ASEAN widened from USD 7.5 billion in 2011 to approximately USD 44 billion in 2023, reflecting faster import growth versus India’s export growth. 
    • This structural asymmetry, combined with India’s prior withdrawal from RCEP in 2019, creates a perception of trade caution that slows the AITIGA review process.
• Slow Progress on Key Connectivity Projects: India’s flagship physical connectivity initiatives, crucial for integrating the Northeast region with Southeast Asia, have faced significant delays due to political instability, security concerns, and bureaucratic hurdles. This failure to meet infrastructure timelines undermines India’s credibility and weakens the tangible impact of its Act East Policy.
  • Both the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project have suffered years of delay, largely due to conflict and security issues in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup.
  • The road component of the Kaladan project remains incomplete, stalling regional logistics.
• ASEAN’s Economic Dependence on China: The deep economic influence of China in Southeast Asia poses a major strategic constraint, limiting how far ASEAN nations are willing to align with India on issues that might antagonize Beijing. 
  • ASEAN must balance its economic dependence on China with its strategic need for alternative partners like India.
  • China and ASEAN have signed an upgraded free trade pact to enhance market access amid U.S. tariffs, boosting trade in various sectors. 
    • This imbalance makes most ASEAN states prioritize economic neutrality over deeper strategic alignment with India, particularly concerning the South China Sea.
• Strategic Ambiguity and the Quad Factor: Many ASEAN members remain cautious about India’s participation in the Quad (with the US, Japan, and Australia) and other emerging security groupings, fearing such frameworks could undermine ASEAN Centrality in regional architecture. 
  • This reflects ASEAN’s traditional preference for non-alignment and its reluctance to be drawn into great-power rivalries.
  • While India supports ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), ASEAN states vary in their commitment to a rules-based order, and there is no collective endorsement of India’s stance on the South China Sea. 
    • Only a few front-line states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, actively seek a stronger Indian strategic role.
• Divergent Approaches to the Myanmar Crisis: India’s policy of maintaining pragmatic engagement with Myanmar’s ruling military junta contrasts with ASEAN’s collective efforts to pressure the regime through the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), creating diplomatic friction and weakening regional coherence. 
  • India prioritizes border security and connectivity over a strong pro-democracy stance.
  • This divergence complicates a unified regional response to stabilizing the shared border.
• Digital Governance and Data Sovereignty Clashes: Differences in digital trade regulations, data governance norms, and cybersecurity policies hinder deeper collaboration in the high-growth digital economy, where India has strong comparative advantages. 
  • India’s emphasis on data sovereignty contrasts with the more open digital trade approach preferred by several ASEAN members.
  • India’s push for data localization through the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDP), 2023 creates friction with ASEAN economies such as Singapore, which support free cross-border data flows. 
  • This regulatory mismatch slows progress toward a seamless, region-wide fintech and e-commerce ecosystem.
• Low Diplomatic and Cultural Visibility: Despite the upgraded Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, India’s diplomatic and cultural engagement with ASEAN is often viewed as inconsistent compared to other dialogue partners. 
  • This uneven engagement contributes to a perception gap and limits the depth of people-to-people trust.
  • The virtual absence of the Indian Prime Minister from the 2025 ASEAN-India Summit in Kuala Lumpur contrasting with the attendance of other major world leaders was noted by host nation leaders. 
  • Additionally, funding for key cultural and educational initiatives remains modest relative to the scale of India’s strategic ambitions in the region.

What Measures can India Adopt to Enhance Ties with ASEAN? 

• Establishing a Project Implementation Unit: India should set up a dedicated, high-level Project Implementation Unit (PIU) under the Ministry of External Affairs, with delegated financial and operational powers, to oversee major connectivity and development projects in the ASEAN region.
  • This “Act Fast” mechanism would bypass inter-ministerial delays and bureaucratic bottlenecks that have hampered projects like the Trilateral Highway.
  • The PIU’s mandate must include real-time risk assessment and security coordination with host nations to ensure continuous on-ground progress—making India a reliable and rapid development partner.
• Pioneering a Digital Governance Template: India must proactively offer a Digital Governance Template modeled on its successful Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) stack but adapted to ASEAN’s diverse regulatory landscape.
  • This should include interoperable cross-border payment systems beyond Singapore, a unified ASEAN-India Digital Skills Framework for upskilling, and a standardized data sovereignty and cybersecurity framework balancing national security with digital trade liberalization.
  • Such efforts would position India as a leader in Smart-Tech Diplomacy for the Global South.
• Formalizing Critical Minerals and Supply Chain Pacts: To strengthen economic security and counter supply chain vulnerabilities, India should propose a Strategic Minerals and Technology Supply Chain Resilience Pact with resource-rich ASEAN members like Indonesia and Vietnam.
  • This pact would secure reliable sourcing of rare earth elements and semiconductors, backed by Indian investment in downstream processing facilities in ASEAN.
  • By fostering joint value-chain creation, it would provide a tangible alternative to existing dependencies and reinforce a stronger economic security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
• Institutionalizing Blue Economy and Naval Logistics Support: India should expand the Year of Maritime Cooperation 2026 into a permanent institutional framework, offering continuous Naval Logistics and MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) support at its eastern ports and select ASEAN facilities.
  • A dedicated Blue Economy and Marine Technology Research Fund could support collaboration in deep-sea mining, sustainable fisheries, and non-traditional maritime security.
  • This would consolidate India’s role as a Net Security Provider in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal.
• Upgrading the AITIGA Review Mandate: The ongoing AITIGA review should move beyond tariff discussions and focus on deeper structural reforms. It must include Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) for professionals in IT, healthcare, and engineering, and streamline Rules of Origin (RoO) verification to prevent trade deflection.
  • India should also offer reciprocal single-window customs clearance to ASEAN, demonstrating commitment to balanced trade facilitation and addressing the non-tariff barriers faced by Indian exporters.
• Establishing a Dedicated ASEAN-India Policy Endowment: India should create a Permanent ASEAN-India Policy Endowment, distinct from existing government funds, managed by a joint board of diplomats, academics, and business leaders.
  • The endowment would finance Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues, promote ASEAN language training in Indian universities, and sponsor a Youth Innovation Challenge on shared priorities like urban resilience and climate action, ensuring long-term socio-cultural sustainability.
• Spearheading a Green Grid Integration Initiative: India must leverage its expertise in renewable energy integration to help fast-track the ASEAN Power Grid through technical assistance in grid modernization, the creation of Green Energy Corridors, and collaboration on battery storage and EV infrastructure standards.
  • This form of Green Diplomacy would advance shared climate goals and position India as a pivotal partner in ASEAN’s transition to a sustainable and energy-secure future.

Conclusion: 

ASEAN-India partnership stands at an inflection point- where shared history must now evolve into shared destiny. By translating intent into implementation, both sides can build a resilient Indo-Pacific rooted in trust, technology, and transparency. The path forward lies not in parallel pursuits, but in synchronized progress. “True partnerships aren’t built on proximity of geography, but on the symmetry of purpose.”

Drishti Mains Question: 

India’s partnership with ASEAN has evolved from historical and cultural linkages to a strategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific, yet gaps remain between intent and implementation. Discuss the key areas of convergence and friction between India and ASEAN, and suggest measures to transform the partnership into a more result-oriented and resilient framework.

           

 

UPSC Civil Services Examination Previous Year Questions (PYQ)

Prelims

1. With reference to “Look East Policy” of India, consider the following statements: (2011)  

1. India wants to establish itself as an important regional player in East Asian affairs.  
2. India wants to plug the vacuum created by the termination of the Cold War.  
3. India wants to restore the historical and cultural ties with its neighbors in Southeast and East Asia.  

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

(a) 1 only   

(b) 1 and 3 only     

(c) 3 only     

(d) 1, 2 and 3   

Ans: (d)

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Mains

Q1. The new tri-nation partnership AUKUS is aimed at countering China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region. Is it going to supersede the existing partnerships in the region? Discuss the strength and impact of AUKUS in the present scenario. (2021)