Multi-Alignment and India’s Strategic Edge

• 09 Dec 2025

This editorial is based on “India’s multi-alignment to the fore in Putin visit” which was published in The Hindu Business Line on 08/12/2025. The article brings into picture India’s firm assertion of strategic autonomy, highlighted by its engagement with Russia despite Western pressure. It shows how New Delhi balances major powers while charting an independent, multi-aligned foreign policy path.

For Prelims: BRICS,  iCET, Artemis Accord, Voice of Global South Summit, Free Trade Agreements, BrahMos ,  India’s LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) approach, Mineral Security Partnership,  Akhaura–Agartala rail link 

For Mains: Main Pillars of India’s Multi-alignment in Global Affairs, Key Issues Associated with India's Multialignment Approach. 

India's recent welcome to the Russian President amid Western sanctions signals a bold assertion of strategic autonomy in global affairs. Despite US tariff pressures and Europe's isolation campaign against Russia, New Delhi has chosen independent multi-alignment over bloc politics. With high-profile Western visits lined up and India assuming BRICS chairmanship in 2026, the message is clear to all powers- India charts its own course. This diplomatic tightrope walk demonstrates how emerging powers can leverage relationships across competing blocs to advance national interests.

What are the Main Pillars of India’s Multi-alignment in Global Affairs? 

• Strategic Autonomy & Aggressive Hedging: India prioritizes national interest over rigid blocs, engaging rival powers like the US and Russia simultaneously to maximize leverage.  
  • This "principled pragmatism" allows New Delhi to secure advanced technology from the West while maintaining continental stability and energy security with Eurasia. 
  • For instance, India imported ~40% of its crude oil from Russia in 2024 despite sanctions, concurrently deepened US ties via iCET and Artemis Accord. 
• Championing the Global South: Positioning itself as a "developmental bridge," India aggressively advocates for the developing world's concerns on debt, food security, and climate finance.  
  • This shifts its role from a passive rule-taker to an active rule-shaper, ensuring the "Global South" is not sidelined in great power rivalry.  
  • For instance, Hosted the 3rd Voice of Global South Summit (August 2024) with 123 nations. Also, India successfully championed the African Union’s permanent G20 membership under its presidency. 
• Geo-Economic De-risking & Resilience: Countering global fragmentation, India is forging Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with complementary economies to integrate into resilient supply chains ("friend-shoring").  
  • This strategy aims to attract high-tech investment and reduce economic dependency on volatile or hostile neighbors. 
  • For instance, India has signed a $100 billion free trade agreement with a four-member European bloc (EFTA) and will lift most import tariffs on industrial products from these countries. 
    • Also, India finalized the UAE Inter-Governmental Framework to operationalize the IMEC corridor. 
• Integrated Deterrence via Aatmanirbharta: Moving from import dependency to a domestic military-industrial complex, India is reducing external blackmail potential through "Make in India." 
  • This dual-use strategy boosts domestic manufacturing capacity while diversifying defense procurement away from single-source reliance.  
  • For instance, India's defence exports have surged to a record high of Rs 23,622 crore in the FY 2024-25.  
    • Also, India has provided BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the Philippines, making it the first country to receive this advanced Indo-Russian joint venture missile system under a $375 million deal signed in 2022. 
• Energy Realpolitik & Green Transition: Energy security is treated as a non-negotiable sovereign right, balancing fossil fuel affordability with a massive green transition.  
  • This pragmatic duality ensures economic stability against volatile global oil shocks while meeting international climate commitments.  
  • For instance, India inked a USD 78-billion agreement to extend LNG imports from Qatar for another 20 years, up to 2048, at prices lower than current rates,  despite strains in bilateral ties. 
    • On the green transition front, India continues to advocate a ‘phase-down’ rather than ‘phase-out’ of coal, arguing that developing countries need policy space for growth.  
      • In global environmental forums, it consistently pushes for a just and equitable energy transition, anchored in India’s LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) approach, which stresses sustainable consumption and responsible lifestyles. 
• Digital Diplomacy & Tech-Sovereignty: India leverages its "Digital Public Infrastructure" (DPI) as a soft power tool, offering an open-source, scalable alternative to Big Tech monopolies.  
  • This creates a unique "tech-diplomacy" footprint, exporting governance solutions to developing nations to build lasting goodwill. 
  • For instance, India linked UPI with UAE’s Aani and Nepal’s payment networks (2024). Also, India signed DPI partnerships to share "India Stack" with nations like Trinidad & Tobago. 
• Minilateralism & Issue-Based Coalitions: Departing from unwieldy multilateralism, India now utilizes agile, purpose-driven groups (QUAD, I2U2) to address specific security and tech challenges. 
  • This allows for flexible, functional cooperation on maritime security and critical minerals without the constraints of formal military alliances. 
  • For instance, India joined the US-led Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) in June 2023 for lithium access and expanded QUAD Maritime Domain Awareness to combat "dark shipping" 

Multilateralism vs Minilateralism: A Strategic Comparison 

Parameter	Multilateralism	Minilateralism
Core Philosophy	“Universal Legitimacy” – Seeks broad participation and global consensus to create widely accepted norms.	“Strategic Efficiency” – Focuses on faster outcomes through small, capable coalitions of like-minded partners.
Membership Structure	Large & Inclusive – Often near-universal (e.g., UN members); open to all states irrespective of capacity or alignment.	Small & Exclusive – Limited to a select few (usually 3–5) with shared interests and complementary strengths.
Decision-Making	Consensus-Driven & Slow – Prone to deadlock due to diverse interests and veto powers (e.g., UNSC).	Agile & Flexible – Quick decisions as members share common strategic goals; action-oriented.
Scope & Focus	Broad & Norm-Setting – Addresses large global issues like climate change, human rights, and global trade through formal treaties.	Narrow & Task-Oriented – Targets specific challenges like maritime security, tech cooperation, or supply chains.
Institutional Form	Formal & Bureaucratic – Backed by large secretariats, charters, and structured processes (e.g. WTO, WHO).	Informal & Adaptive – Typically without permanent secretariats; functions through summits and working groups (e.g., I2U2, AUKUS).
Primary Limitation	“Crisis of Relevance” – Often ineffective due to delays, procedural complexity, and great-power rivalry.	“Crisis of Legitimacy” – Criticized for being exclusive and bypassing universal multilateral norms.
Key Examples	UN, WTO, World Bank, WHO.	Quad, BRICS, I2U2.

 

What are the Key Issues Associated with India's Multialignment Approach? 

• Stress on Strategic Autonomy from US Transactionalism: The shift in Washington from a strategic partnership to "transactional pressure" challenges India's ability to maintain independent foreign policy choices without economic coercion.  
  • This friction exposes the limits of shared values when core US geopolitical interests, like isolating Russia, are not fully met by New Delhi.  
  • For instance, India’s S‑400 deal with Russia went ahead despite CAATSA, forcing Washington into an India-specific waiver and periodically reviving sanctions threats whenever Russia tensions spike. 
    • More recently, The US imposed 50% tariffs on select Indian goods in Aug 2025.  
• Diminishing Returns from the Russia Pivot: While the "Russia pivot" secured energy security, the economic viability is eroding due to payment settlement failures and tightening Western sanctions on Moscow’s financial ecosystem.  
  • India faces a dual challenge: maintaining defense supply lines from a distracted Russia while its discounted oil advantage evaporates.  
  • For instance, Russian oil imports dropped to ~600,000 bpd in Dec 2025 (lowest in 3 years), the RuPay-Mir payment link remains non-operational despite repeated summit announcements. 
• The "China Normalization" Trap & Trade Asymmetry: Despite the October 2024 border patrol pact, the "trust deficit" remains high, yet economic dependence on Chinese industrial inputs continues to deepen, undermining "Aatmanirbharta."  
  • This uneven normalization risks India becoming a dumping ground for Chinese goods while the border threat is merely managed, not resolved. 
    • China has planned and is constructing around 600+ “Xiaokang” (well‑off) border defence villages along India’s border with the Tibet Autonomous Region, including opposite Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. 
  • On the trade front, India's exports to China fell nearly 33% between 2020–21 and 2024–25, even as imports from China rose by almost 74% over the same period. 
• Neighborhood "Delivery Deficit" & Anti-India Sentiment: India’s "Neighbourhood First" policy struggles against a "delivery deficit" in infrastructure projects, fueling accusations of being a "Big Brother" rather than a benevolent partner.  
  • Political instability in partner nations often leads to sudden reversals in ties, as new regimes pivot to China to balance India's influence.  
  • For instance, Post‑2024 political turmoil in Bangladesh has seen India pause or slow key connectivity projects, despite years of rhetoric on seamless North East–Bay of Bengal links.  
    • Major schemes like the Akhaura–Agartala rail link and the Dhaka–Tongi–Joydebpur rail expansion have faced delays, cost overruns. 
• Widening Trade Deficits with FTA Partners: India's rush to sign Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) for geopolitical bonding has inadvertently hurt domestic manufacturing, as imports from partner nations outpace India's export growth.  
  • This "geopolitics over economics" approach risks de-industrialization in sensitive sectors without securing reciprocal market access.  
  • NITI Aayog reported a 23% YoY rise in trade deficit with FTA partners to $26.7bn in Q2 FY25.  
    • For instance, in 2024, India's imports from the UAE surged by 70.37% to USD 7.2 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of USD 3.5 billion. 
• Resource Asymmetry in the Global South: India’s claim to Global South leadership is contested by its limited financial capacity compared to China’s deep-pocketed investment-led diplomacy.  
  • While India offers "voice" and rhetorical support, it struggles to match the tangible, rapid (albeit debt-heavy) infrastructure delivery that developing nations urgently demand.  
  • India’s "development compact" prioritizes low-cost, high-impact "soft power" assets, like digital infrastructure, capacity building, and policy advocacy, because it lacks the deep capital surplus required to fund the massive "hard infrastructure" projects that developing nations crave.  
    • This fiscal reality forces a pragmatic division where Global South nations look to New Delhi for "leadership and norms" but inevitably turn to Beijing for "steel and concrete," limiting India's strategic leverage.  
    • At the September 2024 FOCAC Summit, China pledged $50.7 billion to Africa, dwarfing India’s aid. 

What Steps can India take to Strengthen its Multilateral Engagement amid Global Uncertainties? 

• Institutionalizing "Reformed Multilateralism" via G4 Solidarity: India must pivot from rhetorical demands to aggressive "text-based negotiations" for UNSC reform by consolidating the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) and the L.69 group of developing nations.  
  • The strategy should focus on offering a pragmatic "interim model" with long-term permanent seat assurances to bypass immediate P5 veto deadlocks.  
  • This moves the narrative from entitlement to "functional necessity," positioning New Delhi as the only credible stabilizer capable of bridging the paralyzing North-South divide in global governance. 
• "DPI Diplomacy" as a Strategic Foreign Policy Asset: New Delhi should formalize "Governance-as-a-Service" by exporting its Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) like UPI and the India Stack to the Global South as an open-source alternative to Big Tech monopolies.  
  • By establishing a "Global DPI Repository" managed by Indian technocrats, India can create a "digital non-aligned movement" that fosters technological sovereignty in developing nations.  
  • This builds deep, regime-agnostic institutional goodwill and integrates partner economies into Indian digital standards, creating long-term strategic stickiness. 
• Championing a "Permanent Secretariat" for the Global South: To move beyond episodic summits, India should propose and fund a permanent "Global South Secretariat" based in New Delhi to systematically track and articulate developmental challenges.  
  • This institutional mechanism would function as a policy lab, converting vague grievances on debt and climate finance into "actionable policy papers" for the G20 and UN.  
  • This transforms India’s role from a mere "voice" or postman to a "policy arbiter" and agenda-setter for the developing world. 
• Integration into Critical Mineral Supply Chains: India must aggressively pursue "Critical Mineral Partnerships" (like the MSP) by leveraging its manufacturing potential to offer "value-addition" processing rather than just seeking raw material access.  
  • By co-developing processing technologies with Australia and Africa, India can position itself as the "indispensable mid-stream node" in the global green transition.  
  • This creates "mutual vulnerability" and interdependence, ensuring that Western powers remain invested in India’s economic stability to protect their own supply chain resilience. 
• Operationalizing "SAGAR" via Defense Exports: The "Security and Growth for All in the Region" (SAGAR) doctrine needs to evolve from maritime awareness to "capacity building" through the export of affordable defense platforms like Tejas and BrahMos. 
  • Providing credit lines for defense procurement to Indian Ocean littoral states creates a "security architecture" reliant on Indian hardware and maintenance. 
  • This shifts India from being a passive "net security provider" to an active "security guarantor," countering hostile naval encirclement with its own web of defense partnerships. 
• Norm-Shaping in "AI Governance" and Cyber-Ethics: India should lead the formulation of a "Global South AI Framework" that prioritizes "sovereign data ownership" and prevents algorithmic colonization by Western or Chinese models.  
  • By aggressively participating in the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) and setting the stage in upcoming Impact AI Summit 2026, India can embed its "ethical AI" principles into international law.  
  • This ensures that future global digital rules respect the specific socio-economic contexts of developing nations, preventing a new form of "technological apartheid." 
• Leveraging the Diaspora for "Smart Power" Lobbying: India needs to transition from viewing its diaspora merely as cultural ambassadors to utilizing them as strategic "pressure groups" in their host countries' legislatures.  
  • By facilitating formal "Diaspora Consultative Committees," New Delhi can channel this high-skilled demographic to lobby for favorable trade and visa policies in capitals like Washington and London.  
  • This converts passive "soft power" into active "smart power," creating a sophisticated, decentralized diplomatic buffer against political friction. 

Conclusion:

India’s multi-alignment is not a diplomatic tightrope but a deliberate strategy to turn geopolitical friction into strategic opportunity. As global blocs harden and multilateralism weakens, New Delhi’s calibrated autonomy showcases how emerging powers can engage all without becoming captive to any. In this evolving order, India’s foreign policy reflects a simple truth: “Nations rise not by choosing sides, but by choosing their own path with clarity and courage.” With this approach, India positions itself as a bridge, a balancer and increasingly, a rule-shaper of the new global order.

Drishti Mains Question:

India’s multi-alignment strategy demonstrates a calibrated assertion of strategic autonomy amid global uncertainties. Discuss the main pillars of India’s multi-aligned foreign policy, the challenges it faces, and the measures India can adopt to strengthen its multilateral posture.

FAQs:

Q. What is India’s multi-alignment strategy?
India engages multiple powers simultaneously, maintaining strategic autonomy instead of aligning with a single bloc.

Q. What are the main pillars of India’s multi-alignment?
Key pillars include strategic autonomy, Global South leadership, resilient supply chains, defense self-reliance, energy security, digital diplomacy, and minilateral coalitions.

Q. What challenges does India face in multi-alignment?
Challenges include US pressure, diminishing returns from Russia, trade asymmetry with China, neighborhood delivery gaps, and limited financial leverage in the Global South.

Q. How is India strengthening its multilateral posture?
Through G4 solidarity, DPI diplomacy, Global South Secretariat, critical mineral partnerships, defense exports, AI governance, and diaspora engagement.

Q. How does India balance energy security with sustainability?
By securing long-term fossil fuel deals while promoting coal phase-down and the LiFE initiative for a just and green transition. 

UPSC Civil Services Examination, Previous Year Question (PYQ) 

Prelims

Q.1 Among the following Presidents of India, who was also the Secretary General of the Non-Aligned Movement for some period? (2009) 

(a) Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan 

(b) Varahagiri Venkatagiri 

(c) Giani Zail Singh 

(d) Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma 

Ans: (c) 

Q.2 Consider the following statements: (2016) 

1. New Development Bank has been set up by APEC. 
2. The headquarters of New Development Bank is in Shanghai. 

Which of the statements given above is/are correct? 

(a) 1 only 

(b) 2 only  

(c) Both 1 and 2 

(d) Neither 1 nor 2 

Ans: (b) 

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Mains

Q. “The reform process in the United Nations remains unresolved, because of the delicate imbalance of East and West and entanglement of the USA vs. Russo-Chinese alliance.” Examine and critically evaluate the East-West policy confrontations in this regard. (2025)