India’s Big Leap in Nuclear Energy

• 12 Dec 2025

This editorial is based on “Fission & fusion” which was published in The Financial Express on 12/12/2025. The article brings into picture India’s renewed nuclear push as legal amendments open the sector to private players and a ₹20,000-crore mission accelerates SMR and PWR development through global partnerships.

For Prelims: Nuclear Energy Mission,Small Modular Reactors, Pressurized Water Reactors, Bharat Small Reactors" (BSRs), Atomic Energy Act (1962),  Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLND),2010 

For Mains: Challenges that Continue to Restrict the Growth of Nuclear Energy in India, India’s India Advancement in its Nuclear Energy Capacity and Technology in Recent Years

India is poised for a decisive shift in its nuclear energy journey, with Parliament set to amend key laws to allow private participation across the entire value chain. Backed by the Indian PM’s push for long-term energy security and CO₂ reduction, the government has launched a ₹20,000-crore Nuclear Energy Mission focused on Small Modular Reactors and advanced Pressurized Water Reactors. Global collaborations, from the US to Russia, are accelerating technology access and fuel-cycle support. Yet India’s nuclear capacity remains just 8.8 GW, far short of the 100-GW target for 2047, demanding huge capital infusion and systemic reforms. A dual strategy of SMRs and thorium-based reactors can enable India to build a resilient, self-reliant, and future-ready nuclear ecosystem.

How has India Advanced its Nuclear Energy Capacity and Technology in Recent Years? 

• Indigenous Fleet Standardization (PHWRs): India has successfully transitioned from experimental reactor designs to a standardized "fleet mode" construction strategy, significantly reducing per-unit costs and gestation periods for domestic energy security. 
  • This shift to serial production of indigenous Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) allows for rapid scaling without reliance on volatile foreign supply chains or intellectual property constraints. 
  • For instance, Kakrapar Unit-4 commenced full commercial operations in March, 2024.  
    • The government has approved 10 additional 700 MWe units for fleet mode construction to be completed progressively by 2031-32. 
• Operationalization of Stage II of Nuclear Program (Fast Breeder Tech): The nuclear program is currently crossing its most critical technological threshold by operationalizing the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), which unlocks the capability to use spent fuel and eventually Thorium.  
  • This move effectively ends the "fuel constraint" era by closing the nuclear fuel cycle, multiplying the energy potential of domestic uranium reserves by nearly sixty times. 
  • The 500 MWe PFBR at Kalpakkam commenced core loading in March, 2024, targeting criticality to trigger the start of India's vast Thorium utilization phase. 
• Strategic Policy Shift to Small Modular Reactors (SMRs): Recognizing that large plants cannot decarbonize captive industries or remote grids, India has aggressively pivoted its policy to develop "Bharat Small Reactors" (BSRs) by repurposing existing 220 MWe designs.  
  • This decentralization strategy aims to replace captive thermal power plants in steel and cement industries, directly addressing hard-to-abate industrial emissions. 
  • The Union Budget 2025-26 allocated ₹20,000 crore for a new Nuclear Energy Mission focused on SMRs.  
    • The target is to deploy at least five indigenous SMRs by 2033 to support the net-zero 2070 goal. 
• Institutional Innovation via Joint Ventures (ASHVINI): To bypass the fiscal limitations of the Department of Atomic Energy, the government has restructured implementation models by allowing cash-rich Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) to form Joint Ventures with NPCIL. 
  • This "financial engineering" allows the nuclear sector to leverage the balance sheets of power giants like NTPC, tripling the investment capacity available for new projects. 
  • The NPCIL-NTPC Joint Venture "ASHVINI" was operationalized to execute the Mahi Banswara project (4x700 MW). 
• Resilience in International Cooperation (Kudankulam): India has successfully insulated its critical Russian-led projects from global geopolitical sanctions, ensuring continuity in high-capacity VVER reactor construction.  
  • By securing long-term fuel contracts and localizing component manufacturing, India has maintained momentum on its largest foreign-collaborated site despite supply chain disruptions in Eastern Europe. 
  • For instance, undeterred by global pressures, Russia commenced lifecycle nuclear fuel deliveries for Kudankulam Unit 3 under a new sovereignty-proof contract.  
• Private Sector Entry and Legislative Reform: Breaking a decades-old state monopoly, the government is amending the Atomic Energy Act (1962) to legally permit private players to participate in nuclear generation, not just as suppliers but as partners.  
  • This deregulation is calculated to attract high-volume private capital and efficiency, mirroring the success seen in India's renewable energy and space sectors. 
  • The 2025 Budget speech explicitly proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act and Civil Liability Act. 
    • This aims to unlock an estimated $26 billion in private investment to help reach the 100 GW target by 2047. 
• Record Generation and Carbon Avoidance: The operational efficiency of existing Indian reactors has hit historic highs, functioning as a stable baseload anchor to balance the intermittency of the rapidly expanding solar and wind grid.  
  • This reliability is proving analytically crucial for grid stability, allowing for a higher penetration of renewables without risking blackouts during peak demand. 
  • NPCIL achieved a record generation of 56,681 Million Units (MUs) in FY 2024-25.  
    • This output effectively prevented approximately 49 million tonnes of CO2 emissions. 

What Major Challenges Continue to Restrict the Growth of Nuclear Energy in India? 

• Liability Law Ambiguity (The Supplier’s Dilemma): The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLND),2010 specifically Section 17(b), remains the single biggest legal blockade, as it holds suppliers liable for accidents, deviating from global norms that channel liability solely to operators.  
  • This "recourse" clause spooks international vendors and domestic manufacturers alike, who fear unlimited financial exposure, stalling mega-projects despite diplomatic breakthroughs. 
  • The Jaitapur Project (EDF, France) remains unsigned in late 2025 primarily due to liability pricing disagreements.  
    • Westinghouse’s Kovvada project has seen zero ground progress for over a decade due to this statutory deadlock. 
• The "Capital Cost" Disadvantage vs. Renewables: Nuclear energy faces a severe "economic viability gap" as its high upfront capital expenditure (CapEx) and long gestation periods make it fiscally unattractive compared to the plummeting costs of solar and wind energy.  
  • According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the LCOE for advanced nuclear power was estimated at $110/MWh in 2023 and forecasted to remain the same up to 2050, while solar PV estimated to be $55/MWh in 2023 and expected to decline to $25/MWh in 2050. 
  • Discoms are reluctant to sign long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) for nuclear power when renewable tariffs are significantly cheaper and faster to deploy. 
• Chronic Execution Delays (Time Overruns): India’s nuclear sector suffers from systemic project management inefficiencies, where complex engineering and regulatory hold-ups lead to massive time overruns that inflate "Interest During Construction" (IDC), destroying project economics.  
  • The inability to adhere to construction timelines erodes investor confidence and delays the realization of energy security targets. 
  • For instance, Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) in India faced significant delays, stretching well over a decade from its original 2010 target, with technical issues (especially sodium coolant systems) and procurement challenges pushing its commissioning 
• Land Acquisition & The "NIMBY" Syndrome: Securing large, contiguous land parcels for "Nuclear Parks" is increasingly difficult due to stiff "Not In My Backyard" (NIMBY) resistance from local communities fearing displacement and radiation risks.  
  • This socio-political friction often leads to protracted litigation and protests, paralyzing pre-project activities for years before a single brick is laid. 
  • Gorakhpur Haryana Anu Vidyut Pariyojana (GHAVP) faced significant delays, with farmer protests over inadequate land compensation and resettlement issues delaying the project. 
    • The Mithi Virdi project (Gujarat) was effectively abandoned and shifted to Andhra Pradesh due to intense local opposition. 
• Domestic Supply Chain Constraints: The indigenous heavy industry currently lacks the depth to support the simultaneous construction of the "Fleet Mode" (10 reactors) and SMRs, facing a bottleneck in high-precision forgings and specialized component manufacturing. 
  • Reliance on a monopoly of few qualified vendors (like L&T, BHEL) restricts the ability to scale up production rates to meet aggressive 2047 targets. 
  • Only few Indian firms are certified to manufacture critical Reactor Pressure Vessels.  
    • The industry struggles to meet the requirement of special steel forgings annually for the accelerated fleet. 
• Geopolitical & Technology Denial Regimes: Despite the civil nuclear deal, India’s exclusion from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues to restrict access to cutting-edge technology transfers and creates unpredictability in fuel supply chains. 
  • China’s consistent veto in the NSG prevents India from fully integrating into global nuclear commerce, forcing reliance on bilateral deals that are subject to geopolitical shifts. 
  • China has been blocking India's entry into the NSG, which controls the world's nuclear commerce even though India has the backing of majority of the members 
    • This forces India to maintain Uranium stockpiles as a buffer against potential sanction-led supply shocks. 
• Manpower & Skill Deficit: The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) faces an acute "human capital crunch" as it struggles to attract top engineering talent who prefer the lucrative IT or renewable sectors.  
  • The retirement of the older generation of nuclear scientists, combined with a slow intake of specialized youth, creates a knowledge gap critical for operating advanced Fast Breeder and Thorium systems. 
  • For instance, a Parliamentary Standing Committee report noted nearly three in five of the posts sanctioned for scientific personnel at one of India’s top institutes for basic science research, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR), are lying vacant.  
    • Moreover, a quarter of the sanctioned posts at India’s key atomic energy research institutions and nuclear power plants are vacant.

How can India Upgrade its Nuclear Energy Ecosystem for Long-term Growth? 

• Rationalizing the Civil Liability Framework: To unlock global technology transfers, the government must clarify the "Right of Recourse" under the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act by capping supplier liability or creating a state-backed "Nuclear Insurance Pool" that effectively absorbs high-risk premiums.  
  • Harmonizing domestic laws with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) will mitigate the "unlimited liability" fear that currently deters top-tier global vendors and private domestic manufacturers from entering the high-value reactor market. 
• Inclusion in Sovereign Green Taxonomy: The Ministry of Finance should explicitly classify nuclear energy as a "sustainable" investment within India’s Sovereign Green Bond framework, mirroring the European Union's taxonomy to attract massive global ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) capital.  
  • By formally labelling nuclear power as a "transition fuel" essential for Net Zero, India can lower the cost of capital for new projects, granting NPCIL and private partners access to low-interest "Green Finance" rather than expensive commercial debt. 
• Production Linked Incentive (PLI) for Nuclear Components: The government should introduce a specialized PLI scheme for the manufacturing of critical nuclear components like heavy forgings, reactor pressure vessels, and specialized steel alloys to reduce import dependence and gestation periods.  
  • Incentivizing the domestic supply chain will transform India from a buyer to a global "manufacturing hub" for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), allowing Indian industries to scale up production capacities that are currently insufficient for fleet-mode expansion. 
• Adopting the Hybrid Annuity Model (HAM): To mitigate the risks associated with long gestation periods, the government should adopt the Hybrid Annuity Model, successfully used in the highway sector, where the state shares the initial capital cost while the private player handles construction and operations.  
  • This risk-sharing mechanism insulates private developers from revenue volatility and regulatory delays, making the sector "investible" for risk-averse private equity firms who are currently wary of the high upfront risks in nuclear infrastructure. 
• Strategic International Uranium Equity: India must shift from merely buying fuel to acquiring "equity stakes" in overseas uranium mines in friendly nations (like Kazakhstan, Canada, or Namibia) to insulate its fleet from geopolitical supply shocks and price volatility.  
  • Creating a "Strategic Uranium Reserve" similar to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve will ensure fuel security for decades, allowing the domestic fleet to operate at high capacity factors regardless of fluctuations in the global nuclear fuel market. 
• Pre-Licensing Generic Design Assessment for SMRs: To accelerate the deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), the regulator should implement a "Generic Design Assessment" (GDA) protocol that approves a reactor design once for multiple sites, eliminating the need for repetitive site-specific licensing.  
  • This "Type-Certification" approach would drastically cut down the pre-project regulatory timeline, allowing for the rapid, standardized rollout of SMRs across industrial clusters and captive power plants without bureaucratic redundancy.

Conclusion:

India stands at the threshold of a transformative nuclear expansion, with legal reforms, SMR innovation, and global partnerships redefining its clean-energy trajectory. Yet achieving the 100-GW vision will demand clarity in liability laws, deeper capital pools, and a stronger domestic manufacturing base. Strengthening supply chains, investing in human capital, and securing long-term fuel resilience are now non-negotiable. With the right mix of policy ambition and technological foresight, nuclear power can become the backbone of India’s low-carbon, energy-secure future. 

Drishti Mains Question:

“India’s nuclear energy ambitions hinge not just on technology, but on reforming laws, capital frameworks, and global partnerships.” Discuss in light of the recent push for SMRs, fleet-mode reactors, and private sector participation.

FAQs:

Q. Why is India amending the Atomic Energy Act and Civil Liability Act now?
The amendments aim to open the nuclear sector to private participation, unlock foreign technology, reduce supplier liability concerns, and attract large-scale capital to meet India’s 100-GW nuclear target for 2047. 

Q. What makes Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) central to India’s nuclear strategy?
SMRs offer lower upfront costs, faster deployment, and suitability for industrial decarbonization and remote grids. India plans to deploy indigenous SMRs by 2033 under the ₹20,000-crore Nuclear Energy Mission. 

Q. How has India advanced technologically in the nuclear sector in recent years?
India has moved to fleet-mode reactor construction, operationalized the Fast Breeder Reactor for thorium use, launched joint ventures like ASHVINI, and strengthened international cooperation, especially with Russia and the US.

Q. What are the biggest challenges restricting India’s nuclear expansion?
Key hurdles include the ambiguity in liability laws, high capital costs, construction delays, land acquisition barriers, supply-chain shortages, and India’s exclusion from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Q. What steps can India take to accelerate nuclear growth?
Policy solutions include clarifying liability norms, including nuclear in the green taxonomy, creating a PLI scheme for nuclear components, adopting hybrid annuity financing, securing uranium equity abroad, and fast-tracking SMR design approvals. 

UPSC Civil Services Examination, Previous Year Questions (PYQs)   

Prelims

Q. In India, why are some nuclear reactors kept under “IAEA safeguards” while others are not? (2020)

(a) Some use uranium and others use thorium  

(b) Some use imported uranium and others use domestic supplies  

(c) Some are operated by foreign enterprises and others are operated by domestic enterprises  

(d) Some are State-owned and others are privately owned 

Ans: (b)

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Mains

Q. With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy. (2018)