Mains Marathon

Approach

• Begin by explaining the essence of the quote in the context of India- Pakistan relations.
• Discuss the evolution and challenges of India’s foreign policy towards Pakistan.
• Conclude with a way forward.

Introduction

The phrase “terror and talks cannot go together” became a formal part of India’s foreign policy during the mid-2010s and has been consistently reiterated after major terror attacks like Pathankot (2016), Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), and Pahalgam (2025). However, prolonged diplomatic silence can undermine confidence-building and heighten the risk of conflict escalation, especially between nuclear-armed neighbours. India’s approach thus reflects a balance between security imperatives and regional engagement.

Body

Evolving Policy Postures in India-Pakistan Relations:

• Pre-2014: Engagement through the Composite Dialogue Process, focusing on a broad range of bilateral issues including Kashmir, trade, and cultural exchanges.
• Post-2014: A shift toward assertive diplomacy—visible in actions such as the surgical strikes (2016) and Balakot airstrikes (2019) in response to terror attacks.
• Diplomatic Isolation: India worked to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by raising the terrorism issue at forums like the UNGA, FATF, and SAARC.
• Backchannel Diplomacy: Maintaining low-level engagement (via backchannels or multilateral settings) to manage crises and maintain strategic communication.
  • The 2021 DGMOs ceasefire agreement and the rapid hotline communication between DGMOs that ended the May 2025 conflict are such recent examples.
• Issue-Based Cooperation: India has selectively engaged Pakistan on specific issues, even amid broader hostility.
  • The Indus Waters Treaty—though suspended in 2025—had long survived as a rare example of sustained cooperation.
  • Humanitarian exchanges, such as the release of fishermen or medical visas, have also persisted during crises.

Challenges and Constraints:

• Persistent Cross-Border Terrorism: Despite ceasefire agreements, terror infrastructure across the border remains active.
  • The April 2025 Pahalgam attack, attributed to The Resistance Front, highlights the enduring threat from such groups despite counter-terror operations.
  • Infiltration attempts in areas like Rajouri and Poonch continue, leading to casualties among Indian personnel.
• Involvement of Non-State Actors: Groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba operate with impunity.
  • The Mumbai attacks (2008) and the Pulwama bombing (2019) were orchestrated by such actors, derailing peace efforts.
• Pakistan’s Political Instability: Frequent changes in civilian governments and the dominant role of the military establishment undermine continuity in diplomatic initiatives.
• Public Sentiment and Political Pressures: High nationalist rhetoric and media polarization in both countries limit political space for negotiation.
• Suspension of Trade and Culture: Suspension of trade across LoC and curbs on people-to-people ties (e.g., sports and cultural bans) have diminished informal diplomacy, a valuable peace lever.
• China–Pakistan Nexus: Pakistan’s growing alignment with China through CPEC complicates India’s strategic calculus, especially in Gilgit-Baltistan, a disputed territory.

Conclusion:

As former NSA Shivshankar Menon observed, “India–Pakistan relations are managed hostility. The world does not want Pakistan to collapse into complete anarchy, so they will continue to work with Pakistan.” This reflects a global strategic constraint. Thus, India must continue a calibrated dual-track approach—firm on counter-terrorism, yet open to backchannel diplomacy, issue-based dialogue, and regional cooperation, when conditions permit.