Q. Discuss India's nuclear doctrine and its relevance in the contemporary geopolitical environment. Should India consider revising its No-First-Use policy given the changing global security dynamics? (150 words)

11 Mar, 2025 GS Paper 2 International Relations

Approach

  • Introduce the answer by briefing about India’s nuclear doctrine
  • Give key principles of India’s Nuclear Doctrine and highlight the Relevance of India’s Nuclear Doctrine in the Current Geopolitical Landscape
  • Give Arguments in Favor and Against of Revising NFU
  • Suggest Measures for Strengthening India’s nuclear policy
  • Conclude suitably.

Introduction

India’s nuclear doctrine is rooted in its No-First-Use (NFU) policy and Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), ensuring strategic stability in the region.

  • Since officially declaring itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998, India has maintained a defensive posture, emphasizing deterrence over aggression.

Body

India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Key Principles

  • No-First-Use (NFU): India pledges not to use nuclear weapons unless attacked first with nuclear weapons.
  • Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD): India maintains a nuclear arsenal sufficient for deterrence but not for aggressive posturing.
  • Massive Retaliation: Any nuclear attack on India or its forces would invite a massive retaliation designed to cause unacceptable damage.
  • Non-Use Against Non-Nuclear States: India commits to not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states.

Relevance of India’s Nuclear Doctrine in the Current Geopolitical Landscape

  • Balancing Nuclear Deterrence with Disarmament Advocacy: India calls for a time-bound framework for universal disarmament in international forums like the Conference on Disarmament (CD), United Nations (UN), and IAEA.
    • However, as of 2023, India possesses around 160 nuclear warheads, and its continued modernization, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) like K-4, signals a commitment to strengthening deterrence even while supporting non-proliferation.
  • Managing the China-Pakistan Nuclear Axis: India faces a two-front nuclear threat from China and Pakistan, making nuclear deterrence a strategic necessity.
    • China is rapidly modernizing its nuclear triad, hypersonic missiles, and MIRV capabilities, raising concerns for India’s security.
    • Pakistan’s full-spectrum deterrence policy includes low-yield TNWs, which could be used in conventional conflicts, challenging India’s massive retaliation doctrine.
  • Emerging Technologies and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence: The introduction of hypersonic weapons, cyberwarfare, and AI-driven nuclear command systems poses new challenges to India’s nuclear posture.
    • The 2019 Kudankulam nuclear power plant cyberattack demonstrated vulnerabilities in India’s nuclear infrastructure.

Should India Revise Its No-First-Use (NFU) Policy?

Arguments in Favor of Revising NFU Arguments Against Revising NFU
1. Adapting to Pakistan’s TNWs – Pakistan’s tactical nukes lower the nuclear threshold, making India’s massive retaliation less credible. A flexible posture could strengthen deterrence. 1. India’s Responsible Image – NFU aligns with India’s global disarmament commitment and enhances diplomatic credibility. A shift could appear escalatory.
2. Countering China’s Nuclear Expansion – China’s growing arsenal and Indo-Pacific assertiveness challenge India’s deterrence. A more ambiguous doctrine could strengthen deterrence. 2. Avoiding a South Asian Arms Race – Moving away from NFU could push Pakistan toward a more aggressive nuclear posture, heightening instability.
3. Strategic Signaling – A flexible nuclear policy prevents adversaries from assuming India’s response will always be restrained, reducing miscalculations. 3. Strengthening Second-Strike Instead – Instead of revising NFU, India can bolster deterrence by:

Strengthening India's Nuclear Strategy:

  • Modernizing India’s Nuclear Deterrent
    • Develop Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) to enhance second-strike capability.
    • Advance India’s submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program for assured deterrence.
  • Enhancing Strategic Communication and Ambiguity
    • Retain NFU but introduce strategic ambiguity to increase deterrence flexibility.
    • Clarify conditions for nuclear retaliation, ensuring adversaries do not exploit India’s doctrine.
  • Expanding India’s Diplomatic Engagement in Global Arms Control
    • Advocate for a multilateral No First Use (NFU) Treaty to bring China and Pakistan into a similar nuclear restraint regime.
    • Strengthen engagement with NSG, IAEA, and global arms control initiatives to shape nuclear non-proliferation norms.

Conclusion

While shifting to a first-use policy may increase risks of escalation, strengthening second-strike capabilities, enhancing strategic ambiguity, and modernizing nuclear deterrence would be a more balanced and responsible approach.