



Distance Learning Programme

UPPCS Mains

Internal Security





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INTERNAL SECURITY


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- The tribal populations in the affected states constitute a vital political constituency for state politicians. They are wary of endorsing a unified politico-military policy of dealing with Naxalism for fear that it might lead to disproportionate use of force by state authorities in tribal areas, resulting in tribal alienation.

Dialogue Approach

In 2009, the then Home Minister, P. Chidambaram offered to hold talks with the Naxalites if they were willing to give up violence. The Naxals agreed, but during a 72 day cease-fire the Naxals continued their violent activities, which was termed by the Home Minister as 'bizarre'. He stated that barely three hours after Naxal leader and chief spokesperson, Koteswar Rao alias Kishenji offered the cease-fire, the Naxalites attacked a joint patrol party of the West Bengal police and the CRPF in Lalgarh. Hence, the credibility of the Maoist cease-fire is under question. This discrepancy in behaviour also poses questions about the so-called unity of the Naxalite leadership as it is clear that there are definite differences in opinion among them. This aspect though is advantageous from the military point of view, but is detrimental to dialogue as the terms of the agreement, even if arrived at with one group may not be respected by some other group.

Military Approach

One of the promising proposals which the government is mooted for neutralizing the Naxals is a coordinated effort under a Unified Command structure. Practically stating a lot of responses require coordination among states—in intelligence gathering, in information sharing, in police responses, etc. This strategy can be followed up by a three step process namely location, isolation and eradication for neutralizing the Naxals militarily. Location entails identifying the rebel groups' base areas, which are mostly in thick jungle terrain, through reconnaissance; isolation indicates separation of the Naxal cadres from their support base, involving movement and resettlement of local communities; eradication is based on sound intelligence and operational flexibility of the counter military operations with a high degree of mobility to preempt rebel strategy.

Isolation does not simply mean physically segregating the rebels from the local population. The state must also actively strive to discredit the political message of people's emancipation that the rebels espouse. In this direction the Chhattisgarh government launched in June 2005 a so-called people's movement named Salwa Judum, meaning "peace hunt" in the local Gondi tribal dialect. The movement was launched by a few villagers in Kutru angered by Naxal interference in the local trade of tendu leaves (used for making bidis). However, later on, it was alleged that maintaining law and order in Dantewada and Bastar was outsourced to the Salwa Judum cadres, some of them as young as 15–16 years of age. Some 5000 such cadres were made Special Police Officers (SPOs), given a rifle each and paid ₹1500–2000 a month. Poorly trained, ill equipped and immature, some of the Salwa Judum cadres themselves looted many tribal villages. The then leader of the Opposition in Chhattisgarh, Mahendra Karma of the Congress party, made this movement his political platform. However, in the process, the leadership of the movement lost its tribal face and in the wake of the corruption and killings committed by its cadres, the movement at present has lost its credibility.

For the purpose of eradication of the Naxals, in 2006 the central government deployed nearly 37,000 central security forces in Chhattisgarh and 30 companies in Jharkhand. In August 2006 the Centre announced the possible use of air transport in thirteen Naxal-

affected districts for transporting security personnel, food and medical supplies if not for hardcore military operations. It also contemplated the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in Chhattisgarh for intelligence gathering. Individual states have also raised their special police forces, drawing recruits from Naxal-affected areas. Mine-protected vehicles (MPVs) have also been provided to these states under the Police Modernization Scheme. The government has also instituted police reforms through the “Scheme for Modernization of the State Police Forces,” and upgradation in training of state police forces through the Ministry of Defence, Central Police Organization, and Bureau of Police Research & Development. As per the figures of April 2015, a total of 691 companies of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) were deployed in 10 Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected States viz. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh & West Bengal for anti-LWE operation/Internal Security/Counter-insurgency duties.

Significantly, sometime in mid-2009, according to media reports, the Government of India launched a coordinated joint operation by the paramilitary and state police forces in the border areas of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra. However, there was a lack of clarity on task allocations and coordination. There was confusion in the chain of command in this joint operation, the number of troops deployed, and the composition of the security forces and therefore the operation could not produce the expected results.

Surrender Policies

Naxal-affected states have also announced surrender policies. The Jharkhand government offered ₹50,000 to surrendered Naxalites plus a monthly allowance of 2000, one acre of agricultural land, and educational and health benefits to their children. The Chhattisgarh government offered up to ₹3 lakh for weapon surrender. The Odisha government announced ₹10,000 for surrender, ₹20,000 for arms surrender, and ₹2 lakh of bank loan without interest for two years. But there is no effective intelligence mechanism to identify Naxal cadres. Often, tribal youths surrender as Naxal cadres; many of them even join the Naxal movement to reap these benefits.

Socio-Economic Development Approach

Several studies conducted on identifying the root causes of Naxalism have arrived at similar conclusions and indicate towards issues like severe displacement, forest-related issues, loss of tribal land, and extremely low levels of human development in Naxal-affected areas. The Ministry of Tribal Affairs has also time and again asserted that the scheduled tribes were suffering from a deep sense of deprivation and alienation on account of social, political, and economic factors resulting in acute poverty and lack of adequate opportunities, which manifested in violent resistance.

As a follow-up, the governments, both at the Centre as well as at the state levels have been allocating huge funds for addressing the challenge of development in the Naxal-affected states. However, such allocations have not been able to deliver the desired results on account of several factors like the lack of institutional mechanisms to oversee implementation and hold persons/institutions accountable for misuse of funds. Funds allocated for the tribals get diverted elsewhere, bypassing their intended beneficiaries, and thus fuelling the Naxalite cause.

The following list is a compilation of the various schemes and programmes being presently carried in the LWE infested areas:

- **Road Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I):** Being implemented by MoRTH (Ministry of Road Transport and Highways) since 2009 for improving road connectivity in 34 LWE affected districts of 8 States. This Scheme envisages construction of 5,422 km roads, of which 4,537 km road has been completed by March 2018.
- **Road Connectivity Project for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas:** The Government has recently approved this Scheme for construction of 5412 km roads and 126 bridges/ culverts in 44 LWE affected districts with an estimated cost of ₹11,725 crore. The MoRD is the nodal Ministry to implement the Scheme.
- **Skill Development in the LWE Affected Districts:** Being implemented by the MoSDE (Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship) since 2011 for the establishment of 01 ITI (Industrial Training Institute) each in 47 LWE districts and 02 SDCs (Skill development Centres) each in 34 LWE districts. So far, 15 ITIs and 43 SDCs have been completed.
- **Educational Initiatives:** DoSEL (Department of School Education and Literacy) has sanctioned 8 new Kendriya Vidyalayas and 5 new Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalays in the most LWE affected districts, which did not have any KVs/JNVs. Under RMSA, 1,590 new/upgraded Schools and 350 girl's hostels have been sanctioned in 35 most LWE affected districts.
- **Mobile Towers:** Being implemented by the Department of Telecom. In the first phase 2329 mobile towers have been installed.
- **Special Central Assistance for 35 most LWE Affected Districts:** The Government has approved this new Scheme on 27.09.2017 for providing public infrastructure and services in the most LWE affected districts. The Scheme will continue for 3 years, i.e., from 2017-18 to 2019-20 with total outlay of ₹3,000 crore.
- 'Police' and Public order' being State subjects and the State Governments have their own surrender and rehabilitation incentives to bring Left Wing Extremism (LWE) cadres into the mainstream. However, under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme for LWE affected States approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in September, 2017, there is provision for reimbursement of expenditure of State Governments on the rehabilitation of surrendered LWE cadres of upto ₹5 lakhs for higher ranked LWE cadres and ₹2.5 lakhs for middle/lower rank LWE cadres. They will also be imparted training in a trade/vocation of their liking and shall be paid a monthly stipend of ₹6000/- for three years. In addition, incentives for the surrender of weapons/ammunition are also provided under the Scheme.
- NITI Aayog has launched an initiative for rapid transformation of relatively backward 115 districts, including 10 districts of Chhattisgarh. A large number of LWE affected districts are also included in these 115 aspirational districts. One officer for each district has been designated as "Prabhari (in-charge), who is working in a collaborative manner with the state and district teams to achieve effective convergence between various Central and State Government programmes. Each State has also appointed a Nodal Officer of Secretary rank for regular interaction. The strategy of this initiative includes leadership of states, setting up of real time monitoring mechanism and convergence of the existing scheme of Central and State Governments. The focus of this initiative is empowerment in health & nutrition, education, infrastructure, water resources and financial inclusion, etc.

Legislative Shortsightedness

On 21 March 2006 the Chhattisgarh government enacted security legislation, formally known as the Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act 2005 (CSPSA). The CSPSA's main objective is to deter individuals and organizations from engaging in disruptive activities in Chhattisgarh. It allows persons to be held on mere suspicion and imprisoned for two to three years without any system of appeal. The non-democratic nature of this legislation looks likely to alienate the local population further.

The Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), recognizes the tribal communities' right of self-rule through local institutions. The tribal areas of the Naxal-affected states come under its ambit. However, PESA has not been implemented in letter and spirit in many of these states. Rather than empowering the tribals and assimilate them into a so-called mainstream by implementing legislations like PESA, Schedule Tribes and other traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and Bill on National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007, legislations like the CSPSA would only prove counterproductive to the cause of achieving peace within the state and beyond.

Final Word

Tackling Naxalism is not an impossible task and a valid testimony to it is the successful response to Naxalism in the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh or present Telangana. In the late 1990s, the Naxalite movement in the North Telangana (NT) was on the verge of expanding to the classic 'strategic offensive' stage. The adjacent South Telangana districts and Nallamalla forest areas were in the 'preparatory' stage of a guerrilla zone. Andhra was therefore becoming the symbol of revolutionary warfare in India. However, a strong state response to the Naxalite movement by way of the Grey Hounds, an elite commando force raised by Andhra Pradesh to exclusively deal with the problem, succeeded in curtailing Naxal activity and its leaders and cadres fled to the neighbouring state of Odisha.

Another important facet of the Andhra Pradesh response besides the use of force was the utilization of the "civil vigilante groups" against the mass mobilization strategy of the Naxalites. The police also utilized the surrendered Naxalites in anti-Naxal operations under the names of "Cobra" and "Tigers" to systemically oust leaders of the Naxal frontal organization. Interestingly, along with a police response, the counter-revolutionary operations also involved a developmental response, including schemes like Janma Bhoomi, Joint Forest Management (JFM), which provided people the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the forest. The cornerstone of the Andhra Pradesh response is, however, an effective surrender and rehabilitation policy coupled with a well developed intelligence network. These provided the police with the base for launching operations at the village level and assisting the armed reserve forces and Grey Hounds to optimize the benefits of coordinated work. Police stations were fortified and several Naxal attacks averted. The classic military principle of keeping a way out if surrounded on all four flanks was applied in fighting Naxalism, enabling cornered cadres a means of escape so that they do not fight recklessly. Hence the key elements in the Andhra Pradesh model are:

- Effective surrender and rehabilitation policy.
- Culture of police leadership.
- Delivery on development front.
- Sound knowledge of local terrain.
- Grass root involvement in anti-Naxal operations.

- Incentives to police for good work.
- Superior intelligence coordination and assessment.
- Operations based on local intelligence.

A word of caution herein, however, is worth mentioning. Though the Grey Hounds have done a commendable job in Andhra, utilizing them in unknown terrain could prove disastrous. On June 16 and June 29, 2008, in two successive raids in Odisha's Malkangiri district, Naxals ambushed and killed 38 troopers including 36 Grey Hound personnel. These incidents brought to the fore the fact that despite specialized skills in warfare, these personnel must be provided with detailed intelligence on routes and specific intelligence on Naxal presence. Also, Grey Hounds can be effective so long they are backed by a sound political and social response. The biggest lesson from the Andhra Pradesh response is the fact that a comprehensive strategy of simultaneously activating a surrender and rehabilitation policy, superior intelligence network, local help (surrendered Naxalites), and the use of specialized counter-guerilla force are the necessary tools to counter Naxal violence.

Police Reforms

The Police department of the state governments is first agency which confronts crime and any kind of disturbances in the law and order of the state. In fact, despite the involvement of the army in some areas such as the J&K and the northeastern states and the extensive deployment of the central reserved forces in the Naxal affected areas, the Police Department continues to perform its duties either in supportive capacity or in the shared capacities. However, the state of affairs related to the Police department is not in the best of its spirits, in any state of the country. The Police department mainly governed by the archaic acts and manuals of the British period is crying for reforms and makeover. Various committees and Commissions at various points of time have been constituted to make recommendations regarding Police reforms, so much so that even the Supreme Court in the Prakash Singh v. UoI case has made a case for implementing Police reforms at the earliest, however, there has been total or partial reluctance on the part of the various State governments in implementing the Police reforms. However, in view of the new challenges of internal security appearing before the Police, in the form of the armed insurgency, militancy, LWE and organized crime, we can hardly afford to waste any more time in implementing the Police reforms.

The following list enumerates the various expert bodies that have examined issues of Police organisation and functioning over the last few decades and have come out with recommendations:

- National Police Commission 1977-81
- Rubeiro Committee 1998
- Padmanabhaiah Committee 2000
- Malimath Committee 2002-03
- Police Act Drafting Committee 2005
- Supreme Court directions in Prakash Singh v. Union of India 2006
- Second ARC 2007
- Police Act Drafting Committee-II 2015

The following discussion endeavours to identify the core issues which have been deliberated and recommended upon by the aforesaid bodies:

Core Issues of Police Reforms

Accountability and Independent Complaint Authority

The Police Department operates under the executive control of the state government, which has often resulted in operational biases committed by the force in favour of the party in power. It operates totally as per the dicta of the state government and its operational freedom is often cosmetic. The SRC II has noted that this control has been abused in the past by the political executive to unduly influence police personnel, and have them serve personal or political interests. To allow the police greater operational freedom while ensuring accountability, various experts have recommended that the political executive's power of superintendence over police forces be limited.

The Second Administrative Reform Commission recommended that this power be limited to promoting professional efficiency and ensuring that police is acting in accordance with law.

The states have been reluctant to dilute their control over the Police on the pretext that any watering down of accountability of the Police would make it more in-disciplined and corrupt. This concern of the state governments can be addressed by another proposal that to constitute an independent Complaint Authority, which would accept and investigate into the complaints made against the Police force. Both these bodies should be accountable to the Judiciary in terms of their conformity to operational and procedural norms. This measure would not only grant operational freedom to the Police but also ensure that the Police dare not transgress the provisions of law and refrain from corruption as the watchdog would be easily accessible to the general public.

Further, the constitution of an independent complaint authority would ensure that the public grievances against the atrocities and excesses of the Police are not only impartially heard, but also investigated and brought to the book against the present system where complaints against the Police are made to the Police itself and are also investigated within the department under the aegis of the state government.

Falling Police to Public Ratio

While the United Nations recommended standard is 222 police per lakh persons, India's sanctioned strength is 181 police per lakh persons. After adjusting for vacancies, the actual police strength in India is at 137 police per lakh persons. As of January 2016, the total sanctioned strength of state police forces across India was 22,80,691, with 24% vacancies (i.e. 5,49,025 vacancies). The number of vacancies available, further compound the problems of the Police force already reeling under the problems of scarcity of manpower. Further, the fitness and the morale of the members of the Police officers across almost all the states is also a matter of concern.

The Second Administrative Reform Commission recommended that one way to reduce the burden of the police forces could be to outsource or redistribute some non-core police functions (such as traffic management, disaster rescue and relief, and issuing of court summons) to government departments or private agencies. This will also allow the police forces to give more time and energy to their core policing functions.

Poor State of the Constabulary System

The Constabulary system which constitutes the bedrock of the Police system is in a dismal state of affairs. It has been recommended that constables, which constitute the street level bureaucracy of the police force in general, should receive greater training in soft skills (such as communication, counselling and leadership) given they need to deal with the public regularly. Further, the Second Administrative Reform Commission has further noted that the promotional opportunities and working conditions of constables are poor, and need to be improved. At present, a constable in India can expect only one promotion in his lifetime, and normally retires as a head constable, which weakens his incentive to perform well. It is also recommended that the salaries of the Constables be revised so as to create some resistance to corruption within the system.

The SRC further recommended that the orderly system be abolished across states. In the same reference, the CM of Kerala told the assembly on 18th June 2018, that the orderly system in the police force a vestige of the British Raj, the Chief Minister said it represented a degenerate culture and an undesirable trend. A directive had been issued to examine whether constables on official duty were being engaged by senior officials for domestic and personal services. The practice would be completely stopped, he assured the House.

Upgradation of the Police Infrastructure

Modern policing requires a strong communication support, state-of-art or modern weapons, and a high degree of mobility, especially when it is confronted with a formidable enemy which is equipped with the most modern weaponry system, like the Naxals of the Jihadis. The attack on Taj Mahal Hotel Mumbai by the terrorist revealed the level of training and equipment which these actors are equipped with and to counter such an efficient adversary the levels of training and equipment available to the Police should also be comparable.

The CAG have noted shortcomings on several of these fronts. For instance, an audit of the Rajasthan police force (2009 to 2014) concluded that there was a shortage of 75% in the availability of modern weapons against the state's own specified requirements. The CAG has found that there has been a persistent problem of underutilization of funds meant for modernization. In 2015-16, the centre and states allocated 9,203 crore rupees for modernization. However, only 14% of it was spent.

Police-Public Relations

Another significant aspect of the Police reforms is the improvement of the Police-Public relations. Police and Public relations in India are still bearing the colonial legacy, people are afraid of going to Police stations fearing the high handed and casual behaviour of the Police which has resulted in under-reporting of crime. This phenomenon is even more concerning in the areas infested by terrorism, insurgency and LWE as there is a definite atmosphere of distrust and disbelief created by these groups against the Police and the other state machineries. This aspect is even more compounded whenever there are instances of any Police brutalities or atrocities and especially when such atrocities and brutalities get unredressed.

Furthermore, Police is believed to insensitive, partisan and corrupt to the extent that they hardly heed to complaints if such complaints are not backed by a recommendation from an influential personality of the area or any order from the judiciary or is not discussed