Safeguarding Political Accountability in India | 30 Oct 2025

This editorial is based on “ An amended Constitution Bill, its contentious issues”, which was published in The Hindu on 30/10/2025. The article discusses the contentious 130th Constitution Amendment Bill, which proposes automatic removal of ministers upon arrest for serious offences, highlighting the tension between enhancing political accountability and upholding constitutional safeguards like the presumption of innocence and due process.

The 130th Constitution Amendment Bill,2025, aims to remove the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, or ministers automatically if detained for 30 consecutive days on serious criminal charges punishable by five or more years. It amends Articles 75, 164, and 239AA to enhance accountability and restore public trust. While addressing the criminalisation of politics it raises concerns over violating the presumption of innocence, potential misuse of power, and the challenge of balancing governance with constitutional rights.

What are the Key Features of the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025?

• Amendment of Constitutional Provisions: The Bill proposes amendments to Articles 75, 164, and 239AA of the Constitution, which deal with the Union Council of Ministers, Council of Ministers in the states, and Ministers in Union Territories, respectively.
  • It seeks to provide for the removal of the Prime Minister, a Chief Minister of a state, or any other Minister in the central or a state government, if he is arrested and detained in custody on account of serious criminal offences. 
  • It also applies these provisions to the Union Territory (UT) of Delhi. 
  • Two other Bills have also been introduced to apply these provisions to the UTs of Puducherry and Jammu and Kashmir.
• Grounds for Removal: A Minister will be removed from office if:
  • He is accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or more, and
  •  He has been arrested and detained in custody for 30 consecutive days.
• Procedure for Removal: 
  • At the Union Level:
    • A Union Minister (other than the Prime Minister) will be removed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister.
    • The Prime Minister must provide this advice by the 31st consecutive day of the Minister’s custody.
    • If no advice is given by then, the Minister will automatically cease to hold office from the following day.
  • At the State Level:
    • The Governor will remove a Minister on the advice of the Chief Minister under similar conditions.
    • If the Chief Minister is in custody, he/she must resign by the 31st consecutive day; failure to do so results in automatic cessation of office thereafter.
  • In the Union Territory of Delhi:
    • The President, acting on the advice of the Chief Minister, will remove Ministers following the same 30-day rule.
    • If the Chief Minister of Delhi is detained, he/she must resign by the 31st day, or will automatically cease to hold office thereafter.
  • In the case of the Prime Minister:
    • The Prime Minister must resign by the 31st consecutive day of being in custody on serious criminal charges.
    • Failure to resign by this time will result in the automatic cessation of the Prime Minister’s office from the day thereafter.
• Reappointment Possibility: 
  • Allows ministers to be reappointed once released from custody or granted bail.

What is the Rationale in Favour of Introducing the Constitutional Amendment Related to Political Accountability In India?

• Addressing the Widespread Criminalisation of Politics: The alarming statistic that nearly 47% of ministers across India face criminal charges underscores a deep-rooted issue in governance. 
  • Data from ADR (Association for Democratic Reforms) indicates that 174 ministers face serious charges like murder and sexual assault, which undermines public confidence and erodes the integrity of democratic institutions. 
  • The Bill aims to institutionalise a mechanism for the proactive removal of such ministers, promoting cleaner and more ethical governance.
• Filling Legal Gaps in Disqualification Procedures: Currently, Indian law disqualifies legislators only after conviction, often delayed for years due to judicial backlog. 
  • This enables accused ministers to retain power despite grave allegations. 
  • The Bill introduces a preemptive removal process based on 30 days of detention for offences punishable by five or more years, closing a legal loophole and ensuring swift accountability.
• Mitigating the ‘Governing from Jail’ Phenomenon:  Public disillusionment grows when leaders accused of serious crimes remain in office, eroding faith in the rule of law. 
  • By enforcing swift removal upon detention, the Bill reaffirms the government’s commitment to ethical governance and aims to restore citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and constitutional morality.
  • The Bill’s design reduces scope for political manipulation by setting objective and transparent criteria-detention beyond 30 days on serious charges, for removal. 
  • This ensures procedural fairness, minimizes arbitrary dismissals, and upholds transparency and impartiality in governance.
• Ensuring Uniform Application Across Regions: By extending its provisions to Union Territories such as Delhi, Puducherry, and Jammu & Kashmir, the Bill promotes uniformity in accountability standards. 
  • This prevents jurisdictional inconsistencies and reinforces a pan-Indian framework for ethical conduct in public office.
• Balancing Accountability with Fairness: The Bill allows reappointment of ministers once released or acquitted, thereby avoiding unjust or premature penalties. 
  • This provision respects the presumption of innocence, a core constitutional safeguard, while ensuring temporary accountability during judicial proceedings.
• Symbolic of Ethical Governance and Constitutional Morality: The Bill embodies a commitment to constitutional morality, a principle emphasised by B.R. Ambedkar was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Kesavananda Bharati case(1973).
  •  It integrates ethical principles into political accountability, aligning governance with the values of justice, equality, integrity, and public responsibility enshrined in the Constitution of India.

What are the Key Judicial Pronouncements Regarding Ministerial Accountability? 

• Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014): The Supreme Court ruled there is no legal bar on appointing Ministers with criminal antecedents but advised the Prime Minister to avoid selecting those charged with serious or heinous offences.
• Public Interest Foundation PIL (2018): The Supreme Court held that it cannot legislate or add new grounds for disqualification beyond Parliament’s provisions. Parliament alone has the power to make laws on disqualification. 
  • The SC recommended a strong law requiring political parties to revoke membership and deny tickets to those charged with heinous offences.
• Arvind Kejriwal Case (2024): The SC granted Arvind Kejriwal bail in the liquor policy money laundering case, barred him from official duties, could not compel resignation, but he later voluntarily resigned from office.
• V. Senthil Balaji Case (2025): The Supreme Court directed Tamil Nadu Minister V. Senthil Balaji to choose between freedom or office after noting it had been misled by his reappointment post-bail, which was granted in the alleged cash-for-jobs scam. 
  • He subsequently stepped down from office, and his bail continued.

What are the Key Criticisms and Concerns Raised Against the Bill?

• Violation of the Presumption of Innocence and Fundamental Rights: One of the gravest constitutional objections to the Bill lies in its violation of the presumption of innocence, a foundational legal principle recognised under Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty). 
  • The Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) emphasised that any restriction on personal liberty must be “just, fair, and reasonable.”
  • However, the Bill mandates the removal of ministers upon detention for 30 consecutive days, without any judicial conviction. 
  • Detention, which may result from procedural delays, denial of bail, or politically motivated arrests, cannot be equated with guilt.
    • This provision, therefore, may contradict the natural justice doctrine of audi alteram partem (right to be heard). 
  • Thus, automatic disqualification on mere detention, without due process, represents a constitutional regression rather than moral advancement.
• Potential for Political Weaponisation of Investigative Agencies: Critics argue the Bill’s provisions can transform India’s investigative agencies into instruments of political coercion. 
  • In India’s competitive federal democracy, institutions like the CBI, ED, and Income Tax Department have frequently been accused of selective targeting of opposition leaders.
  • Empirical evidence supports this concern as a 2023 Indian Express report found that over 90% of political figures investigated by the ED since 2014 belonged to opposition parties. 
  • The Bill, though justified in the name of “ethical governance,” risks providing the executive with a legally sanctioned political weapon, bypassing democratic procedures like no-confidence motions or judicial trials.
  • This contradicts the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) on insulating investigative agencies from political interference.
• Conflict with Established Legal and Judicial Precedents: India’s democratic framework already provides mechanisms for disqualification through the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA). 
  • Under Section 8, disqualification occurs only upon conviction, not mere detention or framing of charges.
  • In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013), the Supreme Court struck down Section 8(4) of the RPA, which earlier allowed convicted legislators to continue in office pending appeal. The Court held that disqualification must follow only after conviction, ensuring balance between political accountability and individual rights.
  • The Bill, however, introduces a dual standard — creating a lower threshold (detention) for ministers while maintaining conviction for legislators. This inconsistency breaches the equality clause of Article 14 and could invite constitutional litigation.
• Arbitrariness of the 30-Day Detention Period: Critics argue that the Bill’s threshold of “30 consecutive days” is arbitrary and unreasoned. It neither aligns with established administrative standards nor derives from any judicial logic.
  • Detention for 30 days may occur due to investigation backlogs, denial of bail, or preventive custody under special laws such as the UAPA or NSA, where trials often extend for years without conviction.
  • The Supreme Court in EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) held that arbitrariness is the antithesis of equality. 
  • Without any rational nexus between detention duration and moral unfitness, the provision violates the constitutional guarantee of non-arbitrariness under Article 14.
• Undermining Parliamentary Democracy and Federalism: Parliamentary democracy is built on collective ministerial responsibility and legislative oversight. 
  • The Bill allows the removal of ministers without parliamentary debate, vote, or confidence motion, effectively transferring accountability from the legislature to the bureaucracy and investigative agencies.
  • This dilutes the essence of Article 75(3) and Article 164(2), which bind ministers’ tenure to legislative confidence, not executive or administrative decisions. 
  • The S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) judgment reiterated that majority and accountability must be tested on the floor of the House, not through executive notifications.
  • Moreover, since detention may be ordered under central laws or by central agencies, the provision distorts federalism by enabling the Union government to influence state leadership indirectly. 
    • It may erode the spirit of cooperative federalism envisioned in the Constitution and emphasised in the 7th Schedule division of powers.
• Selective and Unequal Targeting of Ministers:  The Bill singles out the executive (Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, Ministers) while leaving legislators untouched, despite both performing public functions. Such selective accountability violates the principle of equality before law (Article 14).
  • Ministers are already accountable through parliamentary conventions, cabinet responsibility, and ethics codes. 
  • By introducing asymmetric disqualification standards, the Bill risks creating an unequal political hierarchy, where similar offences attract different consequences depending on office.

Committee Recommendations Against Criminalisation of Politics:

• In 1983, the Vohra Committee on Criminalisation of Politics was constituted with an objective to identify the extent of the political-criminal nexus and to recommend ways in which the criminalisation of politics can be effectively dealt with.
• The Law Commission submitted its 244th report in 2014 which dealt with the need to curb the trend of criminal politicians in the legislature posing serious consequences to democracy and secularism.
  • The Law Commission recommended disqualification of people against whom charges have been framed at least one year before the date of scrutiny of nominations for an offence punishable with a sentence of five years or more.
• In 2017, the Union government started a scheme to establish 12 special courts for a year to fast-track the trial of criminal cases against MPs and MLAs.

SC Judgements Regarding Criminalization of Politics:

• Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2002):
  • In 2002, the SC ruled that every candidate contesting an election has to declare his criminal and financial records along with educational qualifications.
• PUCL v Union of India (2004): 
  • The SC ruled that a law nullifying the requirement for election candidates to disclose their criminal records was unconstitutional. The Court said voters have a right to know about candidates' backgrounds for fair elections.
• Ramesh Dalal vs. Union of India (2005):
  • In 2005, the SC had ruled that a sitting MP or MLA will be disqualified from contesting the election if convicted and sentenced for imprisonment for two years or more by a court of law.
• Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013):
  • The SC has declared that any member of parliament or state legislative assembly who is convicted of a crime and sentenced to a prison term of two years or more would be disqualified from holding office.

How can Political Accountability be Reinforced Without Compromising Constitutional Rights?

• Judicially Anchored Removal Criteria: Removing ministers based on arrest without a judicial finding of guilt violates constitutional safeguards. 
  • Implementing independent tribunals to evaluate cases before removal can prevent executive misuse. 
  • This judicial anchoring is essential given that as of 2025, 45% of India’s MLAs face criminal cases, but only 6% convictions have occurred due to systemic delays.
• Interim Suspension to Preserve Governance Integrity: Globally, many democracies suspend officials accused of serious crimes during trial, as seen in the UK and Canada. 
  • This balances the need to maintain governance standards and uphold the presumption of innocence. 
  • With over 27% of ministers facing serious offences like murder or kidnapping (ADR 2025 report), suspension during trial curtails the influence of indicted ministers without premature removal.
• Limiting Disqualification to Serious Crimes: The Law Commission’s 1999 report advises restricting disqualification to offences involving moral turpitude or corruption to avoid penalising politicians for minor or politically motivated charges. 
  • Data shows that states like Andhra Pradesh (56%) and Telangana (50%) of MLAs have serious charges. 
  • Narrowing scope targets genuine threats to governance quality while respecting political pluralism.
• Robust Disclosure and Voter Awareness: The Election Commission and NGOs like ADR have pushed for mandatory disclosure of criminal backgrounds prior to elections. 
  • Though 45% of MLAs declared cases, voter awareness campaigns can empower voters to reject candidates with criminal backgrounds. 
  • Research shows educated electorates and urban voters increasingly vote against tainted candidates, signalling the efficacy of transparency measures.
• Electoral Finance Reforms to Weaken Criminal Nexus: Criminal elements often fund elections through illegal means, entrenching their influence. 
  • The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) recommended state funding of elections alongside strict transparency and auditing of political donations. 
  • Countries like Germany combine state funding with donor disclosure to minimise corruption, providing a model India can consider.
• Internal Party Democracy for Clean Candidate Selection: Nominations largely controlled by party elites enable dynastic or criminal candidates to dominate.
  • Enforcing internal party democracy through mandated primary elections or transparency in selections, as suggested by the Election Commission and Law Commission, will help reduce the entry of criminal elements into politics.
• Judicial Oversight on Arrest and Detention: To prevent misuse of investigative agencies, judicial oversight in arrest and detention decisions affecting ministers’ removal is crucial. 
  • Supreme Court rulings affirm agencies must act within legal bounds, with courts safeguarding against arbitrary detention. 
  • Strengthening agency independence while ensuring accountability through judicial review can reduce political vendettas masked as legal actions.

Conclusion: 

According to Alexis de Tocqueville’s concept of “soft despotism,” democratic decline often unfolds not through overt authoritarianism but through legal mechanisms masked as moral reform. In this context, the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, marks a crucial initiative to enhance political accountability by mandating the removal of ministers detained on serious criminal charges, thereby seeking to restore public trust in governance. However, such reform must be anchored in constitutional safeguards like the presumption of innocence and due process of law.