Reforming the Governor’s Office in India | 02 Dec 2025

Source: ET 

Why in News? 

The Supreme Court (SC) criticised the Kerala Governor for ignoring court-appointed committee recommendations on vice-chancellors (VCs) appointments, highlighting state-Governor tensions.  

• In August 2025, SC formed a Justice Dhulia-led committee to shortlist candidates, underscoring friction in the Governor’s Chancellor role.  

What are the Key Controversies Associated with the Role of Governors in India? 

• Role as Chancellor of State Universities: In most cases, the Governor serves as the ex-officio Chancellor of state universities. Tensions arise when the Governor acts contrary to the state government’s advice, especially in Vice-Chancellor appointments or university administration.  
  • This results in conflicts over institutional autonomy, the limits of the Governor’s discretionary power, and the broader tussle between the central government (which appoints the Governor) and state governments for control. 
• Withholding Assent to Bills: The main flashpoint involves 3 Governor powers, i.e., withholding assent to stall state laws, reserving bills for the President, and prolonged inaction, where bills are left pending for long periods. 
• Appointment and Tenure of the Governor: Governors are often seen as political appointees, usually retired politicians or bureaucrats close to the central ruling party, which creates a perception of bias when another party governs the state.  
  • Their tenure depends on the “pleasure of the President,” allowing the Centre to remove them anytime, especially after a change in government, weakening the independence and dignity of the office. 
• Governor’s Legislative Interference: Tensions rise when Governors delay summoning the Assembly or, during a majority crisis, ignore the Chief Minister’s advice to dissolve the house and instead invite a rival to form the government.  
  • Governors sometimes bypass the Speaker by ordering floor test based on opposition claims and sometimes set procedures (e.g., voice vote vs. physical division) that disadvantage the ruling party. 
• Appointment of the Chief Minister: In a Post-Hung Assembly, the Governor's discretion creates tension when they are perceived to bypass the single largest party or invite a coalition whose majority is not demonstrably clear.  
  • Furthermore, following a CM's Death or Resignation, the Governor's choice of a successor can be highly controversial if the ruling party is internally divided, leading to accusations of partisan interference. 

What are the Various Committees/Commissions Related to Reforming the Office and Conduct of the Office of Governor? 

What are the Key Judicial Pronouncements on Resolving Tensions between the State & the Governor? 

• Nabam Rebia Case 2016: The SC clarified that the Governor’s power to summon or prorogue the Assembly is not discretionary and must be exercised only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.  
• Shivraj Singh Chouhan Case, 2020: The SC ruled that both the Speaker and the Governor can order a floor test-the Speaker, if the government is likely to have lost its majority, and the Governor, if credible information suggests that the majority is in doubt. 
• State of Tamil Nadu v The Governor of Tamil Nadu Case, 2023: The Court ruled Governors must grant assent to re-passed bills unless materially different, setting strict deadlines i.e., one month to withhold assent, three months for actions against Cabinet advice, and one month for reconsidered bills.  
• 2025 Presidential Reference on Governor’s Powers (under Article 143): SC held that courts cannot impose rigid timelines on the Governor (or President) for acting on Bills under Articles 200 or 201. It overruled the idea of “deemed assent.” But the Court reiterated that prolonged, unexplained delays may attract limited judicial review. 

What Measures can Resolve the Recurring Tensions between State Governments and Governors? 

• Codify the Governor's 'Discretion': The SC and Union government should clearly define and exhaustively list the specific circumstances under which the Governor can act in their own discretion, moving beyond the vague provision in Article 163. This would minimize arbitrary interpretations. 
• Procedural Reforms: The "floor test" should be the only legally acceptable mechanism to prove a majority. The Governor should only administer the oath to the claimant with the most support, who must prove majority on the House floor within 48 hours. 
• Institutionalize the Appointment Process: Establish an independent collegium or committee (e.g., comprising the Prime Minister, Chief Justice of India, Lok Sabha Speaker, and the concerned Chief Minister) to select Governors. This would depoliticize appointments and ensure impartiality. 
• Adhere to Established Conventions: Governors should act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and maintain transparent, regular communication with the Chief Minister to ensure cooperation rather than confrontation. 
• Implementing Commission Recommendations: Key reforms proposed by the Sarkaria Commission (1988) and Punchhi Commission (2010)—including consulting the Chief Minister before appointing a Governor and selecting eminent persons from outside the state—should be seriously implemented. 

Conclusion 

The recurring tensions between State Governments and Governors stem from ambiguous discretionary powers and political appointments. A lasting resolution requires implementing key committee reforms, codifying the Governor's discretion, and fostering strict adherence to the constitutional spirit of acting on the elected government's aid and advice.